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SUPPURATION OF POWERS:
ABSCAM, ENTRAPMENT AND THE
POLITICS OF EXPULSION
Henry Biggs1
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously . . . to
declare that the Government may commit crimes in order
to secure the conviction of a private criminal – would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this
Court should resolutely set its face.2
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Introduction
The recent success of the film American Hustle has renewed public
curiosity in the events surrounding the Abscam scandal and its
subsequent trials. What the movie’s colorful representation does not
highlight, however, is the significant legal and constitutional questions
raised at subsequent trials, specifically as they relate to the fate of the
highest official ensnared by the sting operation, Senator Harrison
Special thanks to the University of Rutgers Special Collections and University Archives as well
as Steve Leone for access to and assistance with the Harrison A. Williams, Jr. Papers.
2
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928).
1
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“Pete” Williams.
The fundamental question this operation raised was whether
illegal behavior should go unpunished if illegally induced. Although
Justice Brandeis once noted that “[t]he confirmed criminal is as much
entitled to redress as his most virtuous fellow citizen,”3 honoring
the principle in the Abscam trials would at times rankle. As will be
shown, the unsavory characters involved would prove remarkably
adept at invoking higher principles for protection, almost taunting
the judiciary’s commitment to those principles. However, if these bad
actors were correct and the proposition that induced their illegal actions
was itself illegal, there could only be, gallingly, one legally principled
outcome. As Justice Cardozo famously stated: “[t]he criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered.”4
A slightly more knotty contour to this question would present
itself here, however, when some of the Abscam accused would fail
to effectively articulate the principle that might best serve their
interests. Should it still fall to the principled to save these accused from
themselves, ignoring their fallacious or unpersuasive arguments, and
invoking for them the uncalled upon principle that may save them? The
case of Harrison Williams would offer such a confluence of events. As
guilty and reprehensible as any to stand accused, Williams was caught
in flagrante on video accepting stocks for government influence, one
of six Congressional members ultimately convicted under Abscam.5
Howlingly condemned in the court of public opinion, conviction in the
judicial courts on nine counts of bribery and conspiracy soon followed.6
Surely if ever a Senator deserved the highest Senatorial sanction of
expulsion it was Williams.
Was there a principle, however, that might help him save his seat?
The threat to the doctrine of the separation of powers had promise, for
by his expulsion the actions of the Executive Branch would have had a
direct effect on the composition of Congress. Williams would, however,
fail to effectively articulate the point, instead choosing stubbornly
to simply insist that he deserved unqualified exoneration. Given the
videotapes of his transgressions, such a position strained all credibility
and in turn made it all the more difficult for the Senate to invoke the
principle that might have helped him keep his Senate seat.
Id.
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (N.Y. 1926).
5
Amanda Schreiber, Dealing with the Devil: An Examination of the FBI’s Troubled Relationship with
Its Confidential Informants, 34 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 301, 325 (2001).
6
United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085, 1090 (E.D.N.Y.1981).
3
4
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This Article will argue that Williams’ best opportunity to retain his
seat in the Senate seat was through a separation of powers argument.
To that end, in Part II, the origin and controversies of the sting known
as Abscam—the investigative scheme which ensnared Williams—will
first be detailed. In Part III, the ensuing Abscam-related trials against
several elected representatives will be addressed, with particularly
close attention being paid to the judicial divide over the issue of
entrapment. Here, it will be established that the results of these trials
showed that the entrapment defense was unproductive and needed to
be abandoned by Williams. In Part IV, the meaning and ramifications of
the specific sanctions of censure and expulsion will be explained as well
as the arguments that were presented at Williams’ Senate Hearings for
and against his expulsion.
I. Abscam
A. Origins
Abscam began inauspiciously in 1978 as an FBI sting for stolen art,
a sleepy venture that bore little fruit until it turned its sights on political
figures.7 The sting itself involved a supposed Arab Sheikh who sought
to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in a target’s congressional
district;8 in return, the Sheikh sought legislative favors and offered cash
or other value.9 The proposition was alluring in that the investment part
of the proposition spoke to legitimate civic goals and desires—what
was a representative’s job after all if it was not promotion of investment
in his area? The sheikh’s resources, furthermore, seemed limitless, so
there seemed to be no upward bound to the possible benefits of the
relationship
To obtain this benefit, all the representative needed to do was
show some sensitivity to “Arab culture,” to understand that for such
financial commitments Arab customs required the receipt of some cash
and legislative favors as recognition. For the political representative to
refuse might be perceived as a slight and jeopardize the representative’s
chances.10 Accommodating in this small way would potentially benefit
United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 365 (D.D.C. 1982).
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1982).
9
Id.
10
Id. at 588. To entice Jannotti, one of the undercover agents described the “Arab perspective”
as follows: “ . . . it’s at times difficult to understand now, ah, I can appreciate it because I’ve had
both worlds and I can relate, ah, you know, you folks are here, right, they, they think differently,
they deal differently, their psychological processes are alien to the way I understand exactly what
you’re saying. Ok. I’m coming up with something that’s going to help the City of Philadelphia.
Ah, it would help, as it would help any city. Ah, he does not look on it that way. They do business,
differently. They pay the freight up front. They make friends, right, and then when there, there is
7
8
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the representative’s district enormously—surely it was reasonable for
the representative to show some measure of flexibility and accept the
money?
This irresistible proposition was largely the brainchild of Mel
Weinberg, a convicted, serial swindler who had signed on to the project
as part of a plea bargain to reduce his prison term.11 Weinberg was
familiar with Angelo Errichetti, the Mayor of Camden New Jersey, so
Errichetti naturally became one of his first targets. As Errichetti in turn
knew Harrison Williams from their shared years on the New Jersey
political stage, Errichetti in turn invited Williams to the table.12
While Williams agreed to meet with the sheikh and his
representatives, he was resistant to the sheikh’s proposal of a direct
cash payment. Williams was not entirely disinterested in the sheikh’s
money, however—he offered instead an indirect alternative for his
payment. Williams suggested the Sheik invest in companies financed
by a venture capital partnership, a partnership that would include
Errichetti as well as Williams’ long-time attorney and friend Alex
Feinberg as partners.13 By the sheikh’s investment in these ventures, the
benefit would indirectly accrue to Williams through stock ownership.
The Sheikh agreed and Williams’ attorney Feinberg duly created three
corporations for this investment group with a hidden 18% ownership
for Williams that had a timed vestment requiring disclosure at the end
of Williams’ Senate term. Two concerns of initial interest for Williams
were a titanium mine in Virginia and a processing plant in Georgia.14
The FBI captured all of Williams’ machinations on videotape, and
while Williams would try to argue his innocence, the video evidence
made his assertions untenable, even absurd. The tapes showed instead
a politician that was calculatingly corrupt, cravenly maneuvering to
avoid detection by authorities. Williams’ criminal participation in this
most “tawdry, greedy enterprise” was as clear as the celluloid it was
registered on.15
However, for all of Williams’ clear participation, had the constable
blundered and acted illegally in its pursuit of Williams? When the FBI
a potential problem then I don’t mean, I don’t mean a problem that would necessarily close down
construction and throw the project out of Philadelphia.”
11
Mary Thornton, Abscam Ex-Prosecutors Assail Middleman’s Role, Wash. Post, June 3, 1982 at A14.
Weinberg was indeed committed to the art of swindling. Evidence would later show that while he
was working for the FBI, he was actually swindling them.
12
Williams, 529 F. Supp. at 1096.
13
Id. at 1090.
14
Williams, 529 F. Supp. at 1090.
15
128 Cong. Rec. 3646 (1982).
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had offered him cash, he had clearly said “no.” Rather than accept the
“no,” had they instead cajoled and wheedled him into a “yes”? If so, he
had a fair case for entrapment, and he would have to be set free.
B. Entrapment
In 1928, the question as to what constitutes entrapment first
became a subject of Supreme Court scrutiny in Casey v. United States.16
Government agents worked out an agreement with a prison inmate
to order morphine from a lawyer who was suspected of smuggling
drugs for his clients.17 While the majority deemed the agents’ arranged
purchase acceptable, Justice Brandeis vigorously disagreed in dissent.
Brandeis warned “[t]he Government may set decoys to entrap criminals,
[b]ut it may not provoke or create a crime and then punish the criminal,
its creature.”18 (Italics added). Under Brandeis’ analysis, the government
must limit itself to serving as a passive additional lure to existing crime
rather than as an active, coaxing participant in its own wholly selfcreated crimes. If the government engaged actively in crimes of its own
invention, then the criminal would have to be let off the hook.19
It is important to remember, however, that Brandeis’ opinion was
in dissent. Under the majority’s analysis, the government’s misconduct
was not entirely dispositive: the target’s predisposition to commit
the crime was also to be considered. If the target was deemed likely
to commit the crime, then the target could still be found guilty; if the
targets seemed instead coerced or lured by the government against
their predisposition, they would have to be found innocent.
Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928).
Id. at 416–17.
18
Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928). Noted in Bennett Gershman, “Abscam, the
Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment,” 91 Yale Law Journal 1565, 1568 (1981–82).
19
The nature of the defense was outlined and successfully pled later in United States v. Sorrells,
877 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1986) and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1968). In Sherman,
an agent befriended a recovering addict in a rehab clinic and asked him where he could get
drugs. Although the addict initially tried to avoid answering, the agent preyed on his emotions,
relating his suffering and his own inability to stay free of drugs. In sympathy and against his
better inclinations, the target relented and obtained narcotics for the agent. The Court noted
that the determining factor was to see whether the accused was “induced” to commit the crime
and whether he would have been predisposed otherwise. While it conceded that stealth was a
necessary part of police tactics in detecting and ferreting out crime, it noted that a line was crossed
when “they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged
offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.” Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958). Justice Warren stated further that “[t]he stealth and strategy become
as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search. Congress
could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into
violations.” Id. Chief Justice Warren noted further that “(t)o determine whether entrapment has
been established, a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for
the unwary criminal.” Id.
16
17
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Judging from these standards, Abscam was difficult to classify.
Was Abscam a new crime made out of whole cloth and had the agents
been too active, or was it the legitimate outgrowth of other observed
international threats of bribery? There were internal documents that
suggested it was to some degree a government creation, concocted in
significant part by the swindler Weinberg. Furthermore, following the
majority standard, it was difficult to classify Williams’ predisposition.
Did they pursue him because of evidence of prior criminal behavior?
Had they cajoled him into agreeing to their offer or had he been eager?
These issues would be vigorously debated once Williams and his fellow
accused politicos went to trial.
II. The Abscam Cases
A. United States v. Jannotti
One of the first political moths to the Abscam fire was Harry Jannotti,
a councilman for the City of Philadelphia.20 The sheikh’s representatives
offered him substantial investment in the councilman’s district but
asked that he take $10,000 in cash to make the Arab enterprise feel
more comfortable.21 The Sheikh’s representative said it was simply “the
Arab way of doing business.”22 The prospect of rejuvenating several
run-down areas in Philadelphia naturally appealed to the Councilman.
Easily persuaded by the argument of “Arab custom,” Jannotti took the
cash and put it in his pocket, saying “we won’t even discuss it.”23
At the ensuing trial, the district court sympathized with the
temptation offered to the councilman and overturned the guilty verdict
of the jury. Jannotti had been led to believe that Philadelphia would
not get the benefit of the hotel project if he refused the money.24 The
court noted that given “the context of the fiscal crises which beset all
large cities . . . and . . . the problems of urban blight and decay, the
government inducement . . . was indeed calculated to overwhelm.”25
The appellate court disagreed, however, and found Jannotti did have the
predisposition, noting he “accepted the money readily, unprotestingly,
even casually, without ever once attempting to use [his] consummate
political skill to say, as diplomatically as the circumstances required,
“Thanks, but no thanks.”26
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 598 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
Id.
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 598 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 606.
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However, Judge Aldisert arguing in dissent found the fundamental
nature of Abscam repugnant. As he noted, “[t]he majority opinion reads
like a paean to the FBI for its conduct in this case; but as an American
citizen and as a federal judge, I find that conduct revolting.”27 Instead,
Judge Aldisert agreed with Justice Holmes that in certain cases of
government misconduct, it is a “less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.”28 Jannotti
was ultimately convicted on all charges.
Although judicially contentious, Jannotti’s cash payment was
straightforward. The councilman had been relatively quickly persuaded
and had put the money in his pocket. Williams’ actions could be
distinguished in that they had taken place over an extended period
of time and involved no cash exchange. That the courts had shown a
strong disagreement as to the entrapment standard even with Jannotti’s
brazen actions was encouraging for Williams. The facts in United
States v. Kelly, addressed in the next section, would be somewhat less
straightforward than Jannotti and prove all the more contentious.
B. United States v. Kelly
In United States v. Kelly, Abscam agents offered Florida
Representative Richard Kelly investment in his district for cash and
the promise of government favors. Again, judicial disagreement would
surface as to whether Kelly had been entrapped. Kelly’s case was
initially dismissed, with the district court issuing a strong rebuke to
the government for its outrageous conduct in the matter.29 The district
court warned that “the litmus test for temptation” should be one which
involves a threshold consistent with one’s ordinary dealings and that
anything further “creates a whole new type of crime that would not
exist but for the government’s actions.”30 Although the district court
used an objective standard in making its decision, it noted that even
under the “predisposition” standard Kelly would prevail for he had
refused the agents’ offers on several occasions.31
In a recurring refrain, the district court also observed that the
Abscam sting was unfairly devious in its use of “legal and illegal bait:”
a strong legitimate attraction of investment coupled with the illegal
Id. at 612.
Id.
29
United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 365 (D.D.C. 1982).
30
Id. at 374.
31
Id. at 372 (noting evidence that showed that the agents repeatedly tried to offer him money
and that he steadfastly refused the offer, remaining interest only in the legitimate proposed
investments that the agents purported might be made available to his city).
27
28
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component of a bribe.32 This created an additional temptation on the
target to bend his ethical standards because of the huge benefit that
would legitimately accrue to his constituents.
However, as in Jannotti, the appellate court again reversed,
holding that there were strong public needs that must be considered
as government officials were “not recruited from the seminaries and
monasteries across the land.”33 In view of the goal of keeping public
officials honest, the court found that “the FBI’s conduct . . . insofar as it
involved Kelly . . . simply did not reach intolerable levels.”34
Again, the courts disagreed as to the standard, but ultimately
the result would be conviction. The facts here were more analogous
to those of Williams but still could arguably be distinguished. While
Kelly, like Williams, initially refused the offer of direct cash payment,
he ultimately accepted a direct cash payment.35 Williams, however, had
not.
C. United States v. Williams
While Jannotti had accepted cash and Myers had accepted cash
payment after an initial refusal, Williams’ proposed payment was to be
achieved through transactions “more complex and more subtle” than
his fellow accused.36 Not only did Williams’ case present complexity
in the nature of his benefit, but also simply in terms of time spent, as
Williams met with the agents repeatedly.37
As stated earlier, Williams proposed that “Abdul Enterprises”
invest in companies under Williams’ umbrella enterprise, creating an
indirect benefit to him through his ownership of the underlying stocks
Id. at 372.
United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1473 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
34
Id. at 1474.
35
United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). This case was another Abscam
case involving a political representative who argued for entrapment. In that case, Judge Pratt
would decline to use the objective standard, focusing instead on the predisposition of the
defendants. He noted that regardless of the government’s conduct, the defendants “could simply
have said ‘no’ to the offer” and avoided criminal liability. In particular, he rejected the contention
that the inducements offered by the government were overwhelming, since “[n]o matter how
much money is offered to a government official as a bribe or gratuity, he should be punished if
he accepts.” Myers 527 F. Supp. at 1228. Underlying Pratt’s support of the government’s actions
was the great public interest he perceived to be at stake. Official corruption, he noted, posed a
danger greater than any foreign enemy: “[T]he government needs to have available the weapons
of undercover operations, infiltration of bribery schemes, and “sting” operations such as Abscam
in order to expose those officials who are corrupt, to deter others who might be tempted to be
corrupt, and perhaps most importantly, to praise by negative example those who are honest and
square-dealing.” Id. at 1229.
36
United States v. Williams, 529 F. Supp. 1085, 1090 (D.C.N.Y.1981).
37
Id. at 1091.
32
33
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and certificates. The legal work and front man would be Williams’
lawyer, Alex Feinberg, sometimes referred to as the “bagman” by the
United States government.38
At trial, Williams tried to advance the argument that the FBI tapes
of these events showed his proposal was a legitimate above-board
business transaction. Williams argued further that any inculpating
statements on his part were the product of “coaching” by Mel Weinberg.
Following Williams’ logic, Weinberg had pressed these terms on him
and made it impossible for him to say no or speak “his own mind.”39
The court was not persuaded, finding that given all of Williams
“fine educational background, his long political experience, the
heights to which he had risen in the councils of government” it was
less than credible for him to then claim that others could “put words
in his mouth.”40 The court suggested that such an argument might be
tenable for a person whose livelihood was not grounded in regular
public speaking, but for Williams, asserting this diffidence was absurd.
The swindler Weinberg would agree, putting it more colorfully in a
separate interview:
I don’t understand all this entrapment bulls—t from
the defense lawyers. Like . . . I’m supposed to have
told the Senator what to say in the hotel. He’s a United
States Senator. Why’s he takin’ orders from a hood
like me? He always coulda said “No.” Nobody twisted
anybody’s arm to take the bread. We said it was there if
they wanted it. They knocked each other over tryin’ to
be first on the bread line.41
In spite of Williams’ strenuous efforts at pleading his innocence, it
was difficult for anyone to see beyond the video images of Williams
greedily plotting, arranging for the receipt of his stocks and certificates.
At trial, Williams advanced additionally the notion of executive
overreaching, contending that he had been singled out by the
Executive Branch for his support of Ted Kennedy in the 1980 election
rather than for the incumbent, Jimmy Carter.42 Williams then altered
his argument, stating that he was not so much targeted as subject to
“honesty” or investigatory-style tests that were not administered to
38
39
40
41
42

Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1099.
Robert Greene, The Sting Man: Inside Abscam 185 (Dutton 1981).
Williams, at 1101.
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Carter supporters. In short, Williams claimed that he was negatively
selected as a result of the justice department officials’ failure to inform
him that he was under investigation. The court dismissed this claim,
finding that it lacked merit. The court made short work of this claim,
noting that Williams’ framing of the issue was simply not supported by
evidence already presented at earlier due process hearings.43
In the end, in terms of his argument for entrapment the court had
termed Williams’ arguments on the standard an unpersuasive “rehash
of the general issue.”44 To reasonable minds, after the run of Abscam
cases where the defense of entrapment had failed, this should have
made it clear that to argue it was a losing proposition. Would Williams
adjust accordingly therefore in the upcoming Senate hearings? After
all, the Senate proceedings offered a new forum with new rules and
therefore all the more opportunity to redefine his position. Here, the
issue could be couched beyond one man’s innocence or guilt and writ
large as the Executive Branch riding roughshod over the Legislature.
The Senate, furthermore, was in no way bound by judicial decisions,
so Williams’ failure in court would not be fatal to his chances in the
Senate. The highlighting of the Executive authority’s overreaching in
this new setting would be all the more relevant because it would speak
to a potential direct threat to its audience. For Williams’ to hold his
Senate seat, however, it would be important if he wished to save his seat
for him to accentuate the heightened risks to legislative independence
of expulsion over censure.
III. The Senate Hearings
A. The Proposed Sanctions
There was little question that Williams would be sanctioned—
the question was simply one of degree. The two sanctions offered at
Williams’ Senate proceeding were expulsion, proposed unanimously
by the Senate Ethics Committee, and censure, suggested in a separate
resolution by Senator Alan Cranston.45 While the two measures were to
some degree similar in effect, there were real and symbolic differences
as well.
1. Expulsion
In terms of the sanction of expulsion, historically, there had been
fourteen Senators expelled, all Southern, convicted of high treason for
43
44
45

Id.
Williams, at 1094.
128 Cong. Rec. 2954, 2998 (1982).
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their secession during the Civil War.46 In over a century since that time,
no other Senator had been expelled. Interestingly, there had been only
one member of the House of Representatives to lose his seat outside of
that Civil War era: Michael Myers, following his Abscam convictions.47
There had been some close calls, but in the end those subsequently
under consideration had discretely resigned or not been re-elected.48
That meant that the only precedent the Senate had for expulsion was
for high treason. Had over a hundred years of precedent established
high treason as the only offense meriting expulsion?
A review of original constitutional drafting documents provides
little additional insight as to the intended scope of expulsion. The
only comment in the original documents on the expulsion clause
was a request from James Madison that the vote for expulsion be
increased from a pure majority to two-thirds, arguing that ‘the right of
expulsion . . . might [otherwise] be dangerously abused.”49 Gouveneur
Morris, the man charged with drafting the final copy of the Constitution,
disagreed, arguing that requiring a two-thirds majority might create its
own mischief, “allowing [a] few men from factious motives . . . [to]
keep in a member who ought to be expelled.”50 Madison’s amendment
ultimately carried the day and that is the last comment or clarification
the drafters would offer on the expulsion provision.51
Expulsion has, however, historically not been the only Congressional
punitive game in town. Congress has taken advantage additionally of
the phrase in the Constitution which provides that it may generally
“punish[] its members for disorderly behavior.”52 Historically and
statistically, Congress has chosen to use this less clearly defined
authority to create its own less severe sanctions.53 The only alternative
Expulsion and Censure, United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2014).
47
Id.
48
Jack Maskell, Cong. Research Serv., RL31382, Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine:
Legislative Discipline in the House of Representatives 5 (2013).
49
2 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 254 (1937).
50
Id.
51
Id. (The original framers had additional concern over the implications of legislators throwing
out representatives who had been duly represented by their people).
Laura Ray Discipline through Delegation: Solving the Problem of Congressional Housecleaning, 55
Univ. of Pittsburgh Law Review 389, 392 (1994). (Under original documents, a provision allowed
that “[e]ach House may expel a Member, but not a second Time for the same Offence.” The
framers worried, however, that if legislators repeatedly expelled a member duly elected by its
constituency, they would create the possibility for legislators to subvert the will of the people.
The provision of “not a second Time for the same Offence”, however, was ultimately removed,
allowing theoretically the possibility for legislators to indeed engage in such subversion.).
52
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2.
53
Jack Maskell, Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine: Legislative Discipline in the House
of Representatives 22 (2013). (Maskell states specifically “[i]n the House of Representatives there
46

260

Suppruration of Powers

sanction that was seriously under consideration in Williams’ case,
whose authority is implied from this clause, was that of censure, the
parameters of which will be addressed in the following section.
2. Censure
Expulsion can be an unnecessarily severe method of achieving a
desired end, and even raise constitutional questions of its own.54 If
someone has committed less than proper conduct, a sanction of some
sort is in order, but it may not necessarily be the case that the extreme
measure of removal from office is appropriate. Censure offers an
effective alternative. It shows Congressional disapproval but leaves
the question of removal from office to the offender’s constituents.55
Furthermore, censure is more politically easy to achieve, requiring a
simple majority rather than a two-thirds majority.56
In terms of those offenses which have historically qualified for
censure, often some level of financial misconduct has been at issue. In
1967 Thomas Dodd of Connecticut was censured for using his office
to put campaign funds to personal use.57 In 1979 Herman Talmadge
of Georgia was censured for accepting reimbursements for expenses
he had not incurred and for improperly reporting his campaign
expenditures.58 In 1990 David Durenberger was censured for shady
real estate transactions and conversion of campaign contributions to
personal use.59 As Williams’ offenses were also financial in nature, the
sanction of censure did have an arguable precedential application.
While there are other lesser methods of disciplining as well, none
of these were proposed on the Senate floor and so fall beyond our

have been 22 “censures” of Members (21 Members and 1 Delegate), including two censures of
former Members who, in 1870, had resigned just prior to the House’s consideration of expulsion
motions against them for selling military academy appointments. While the majority of the
censures in the House occurred in the 19th century and concerned issues of decorum, that is,
the use of un-parliamentary or insulting language on the floor of the House or acts of violence
towards other Members, in more recent years instances of financial misconduct have appeared to
have been a major issue.” Id. at 13.
54
128 Cong. Rec. 3448, 3483 (1982). (Senator Heflin noted at the outset of the Senate hearings that
concern had been expressed over a possible violation of Article I, Section 3 which provides that
the Senate “shall be composed of two Senators from each State.”).
55
Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben Tillman, South Carolinian 11 (2002). (Only one senator has
managed to be re-elected after censure—Benjamin “Pitchfork” Tillman, in 1902 who was censured
for assaulting another Senator on the house floor.).
56
Jack Maskell, supra note 53, at 11.
57
Expulsion and Censure, United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2014).
58
Id.
59
Id.
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scope here.60 The question for Williams was simply one of censure
or expulsion. On this new disciplinary stage, Williams needed to
understand that the context had changed, that the battle was no longer
to prove his innocence but simply to keep his seat.
To that end, Williams needed to re-channel his arguments in terms
of the interests of the Senators. To focus specifically on the implication
of the dangerous political precedent that might be set by his physical
removal from the Senate. If couched appropriately, fellow Senators
could see that Williams’ guilt on this stage was not the only issue: a
decision to vote for his actual removal would potentially encourage the
practice of legislative stings as an effective method of manipulating the
legislature. It would need to be argued that it did not matter for political
purposes if the legislator succeeded in defending himself against these
executive tactics—the Executive could likely end careers simply by
showing the legislator’s questionable behavior. By articulating this
Although the Senate never seriously considered any of their statutory enactments for Williams,
this might also have been an option that would have provided appropriate severity. Statutory
enactments are a relatively more recent phenomenon developed by the House to more narrowly
proscribe certain conduct. It was not clear, however, if the House had the authority to develop
statutory law against itself in this regard. In Burton v. United States in 1906, the court addressed
just this issue. See Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 360 (1906). In that case, there was a
statute provided that no Senator or Representative was to receive compensation of any sort for
any matter to which the United States was also a party. See id. The statute also provided that
anyone convicted under the statute forfeited the right to run for political office and provided for
a punishment of not more than 2 years in prison. See id.
The statute provided specifically: “No Senator, Representative, or Delegate, after his election
and during his continuance in office, and no head of a department, or other officer or clerk in
the employ of the government, shall receive or agree to receive any compensation whatever, directly
or indirectly, for any services rendered, or to be rendered, to any person, either by himself or another,
in relation to any proceeding, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other matter
or thing in which the United States is a party, or directly or indirectly interested, before any
department, court-martial, bureau, officer, or any civil, military, or naval commission whatever.
Every person offending against this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall
be imprisoned not more than two years, and fined not more than ten thousand dollars, and shall,
moreover, by conviction therefor, [sic] be rendered forever thereafter incapable of holding any
office of honor, trust, or profit under the government of the United States.’” Id. (citing Act of June
11, 1864, ch.119, § 1782, 12 Stat. 123, 123 (1864)).
Burton was convicted under the statute for agreeing to receive $2,500 to use his influence on
behalf of a grain company. Id. at 360. Burton argued, inter alia, that the statute was unconstitutional
in that, by removing him from office and not allowing him to run again, the statute interfered
“with the legitimate authority of the Senate over its members.” Id. at 360. The Constitution
provided for a Senator to serve a specified number of years and the statute’s provisions were
voiding these provisions of the Constitution.
The Court was not convinced by these arguments, focusing instead on the power of Congress
to “enact such statutes . . . as the public interests required for carrying into effect the powers
granted to it.” Id. at 367. The Court held that Congress possessed “the entire legislative authority
of the United States,” as provided explicitly in the Constitution and so was free to do as it saw
fit to police its own body. Id. at 366–67. Turning to the statute in question, the Court held that
the statute “can be executed without in any degree impinging upon the rightful authority of the
Senate . . . “ Id. at 367.
60
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effectively, Williams could speak to their own threatened legislative
interests, and he might live politically to fight another day. As will be
shown in the next section, rather than capitalize on this possibility,
Williams would concede on no fronts, continuing to argue for his
absolute innocence and to warn, with only limited conviction or
precision, of the larger danger to legislative independence, a strategy
which would lead to predictable results.
B. The Senate Hearings
The Senate Ethics Committee, after a careful independent
investigation, had unanimously agreed that Williams’ conduct was
“ethically repugnant” and had recommended his expulsion from the
Senate.61 The introductory remarks at the outset of this hearing were to
a great degree perfunctory or limited to addressing or the difficult duty
they had to sanction their own.62
1. Round One: Senators Wallop and Inouye
The Republican Senator Malcolm Wallop, a member of the
Ethics Committee, began by setting forth the findings in Williams’
Ethics Committee hearings, detailing the offenses of Williams and
recommending his expulsion for the honor and integrity of the Senate.63
Wallop stressed that censure was not an adequate sanction given the
degree of Williams’ breach of the public trust.64 Wallop addressed
Williams’ contentions of executive overreaching, but only insofar as
Williams had argued them. Furthermore, he assured the Senators
there would be a full, separate investigation. Wallop did not, however,
address the additional significance of Williams’ removal from the
Senate that expulsion demanded because Williams himself had never
made the distinction.
Senator Inouye, representing Williams on the floor, responded to
Wallop’s review first by stressing precedential historical perspective.65
This had some limited promise as a strategy for Williams’ cause in that
it at least spoke to the Senators’ sense of history and tugged at their
respect for tradition. Inouye noted that the last time Senators had been
expelled was during the Civil War, for high treason.66 Clearly, Senator
Inouye argued, over a hundred years of history had established treason
61
62
63
64
65
66

128 Cong. Rec. 2976 (1982).
Id. at 2974.
Id. at 2974–76.
Id. at 2976.
Id. at 2992.
Id. at 2992, 2996.
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as the necessary benchmark for expulsion. Williams’ conduct, clearly
repugnant though it was, did not rise to the level of treason and so
merited a lesser sanction. Inouye was more astute than Williams on
this front—where Williams conceded nothing, Inouye better gauged
his audience and understood that censure was Williams’ best available
option.
Inouye then did speak to the Senate’s interests as a body, addressing
the attendant threat of compromised legislative independence. He
warned the Government actions “add[ed] up to an encroachment on
the independence of the legislative branch which we cannot tolerate if
we are to be separate and coequal.”67 However, Inouye failed to further
develop the argument, to frame it in terms of how it threatened those
coequal powers, and most importantly, how expulsion particularly
would signify a heightened legislative compromise, the danger of the
additional action of throwing out a Senator. Instead, Inouye simply
moved on to other concerns and tried to trivialize Williams’ actions,
asserting that Williams had behaved “as we all might in such a
situation.”68 By only marginally speaking to the dangerous heightened
implications of expulsion and failing to commit fully to the principle,
Inouye too left the issue obscured for the Senators.
2. Round Two: Senators Heflin and Williams
Inouye’s argument was vigorously countered by the Democratic
Senator Heflin, a co-chair of the Ethics Committee investigation and also
charged with presenting the case against Williams. Heflin commented
caustically that if precedent had established treason as the standard,
was expulsion therefore not to be appropriate for rape or murder, even
the murder of a president?69 Surely it was never the intention of the
Framers that expulsion was to be so narrowly prescribed? 70
Following Senator Heflin’s response it was Williams’ turn to
personally make his case. From the outset, it was clear that Senator
Williams planned to make no concessions. Williams stated: “ . . . today,
as I stand before . . . my colleagues, I know that I am completely innocent
of all crime and impropriety and, therefore, totally confident that I will
be fully exonerated . . . .”71 There would be no admission of guilt on
Id. at 2994.
Id. at 2995.
69
Id. at 3480, 3483.
70
Id. at 3646. (Senator Eagleton would more pointedly echo these comments later in the
proceedings, asking rhetorically “[i]f nontreasonous behavior be the sole benchmark of fitness to
serve in this body, then one must ask how fit is this body in which we serve?”)
71
Id. at 3298.
67
68
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any front, no reframing around a higher principle or appreciating the
different significance of his Senate proceeding. Williams would simply
argue before the Senate, again, that in spite of all video evidence and all
jury findings to the contrary, he was blameless.
a. The New Evidence: Williams’ Linguistic Analysis
To prove his innocence this time, Williams introduced new
“linguistic” evidence, conducted by Professor Shuy, a Senior Linguist
at the Center for Applied Linguistics at Georgetown. The evidence
showed, through a sort of meme-like or phrasal taxonomy, that the
agents and Weinberg had verbally and psychologically coached him
into agreement,72 had intentionally blocked him when he tried to
exculpate himself,73 and effectively used peer pressure to obtain his
assent.74
Much of Shuy’s analysis characterized Williams’ participation in
conversations as passive. Shuy found specifically that in his analysis
of six videotapes, Williams introduced topics of conversation a total
of 57 times, while the government agents did so over three times as
often (174).75 Shuy further broke down the types of topics that Williams
introduced into four sub-groups: “requests for information,” “reporting
of facts,” “small talk” and “reporting opinions,” and he noted that his
numbers showed conclusively that Williams did not propose these
ventures but was truly an “outsider” to the information and had only
passively assented to the proposals of others.76
This extensive linguistic analysis led the linguist to conclude that
Williams was categorically innocent:
1. Senator Williams did no [sic] agree to use his
influence or position to secure Government
contracts for the proposed mining venture.
2. Senator Williams did not agree to hide his
interest in the proposed mining venture.
3. Senator Williams did not accept a bribe for
sponsoring legislation on behalf of the presumed
Arab sheik.
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 3323.
Id. at 3324.
Id. at 3325.
Id. at 3316.
Id. at 3316–17.
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4. Senator Williams did not link the sponsoring of
legislation on behalf of the presumed sheik to
securing a loan from the sheik for the proposed
business venture.77
This new analysis, commended by Senator Hayakawa of California, a
linguist, and another linguist/JD, Mary Gallagher, likely fell on deaf
ears.78 Senators, realizing that Williams was simply introducing new
evidence to argue a point that had been unpersuasive for previous
finders of fact, were likely quick to view the evidence as simply old
news.
This “new” linguistic strategy tried to do little more than paint
the FBI agents as verbal voodooists, who hexed him into agreeing
to criminal enterprises.79 Senator Wallop would have scant difficulty
in rebuttal recognizing that this evidence was little more than thinly
disguised retread.
b. Linguistic Evidence Dismantled:
Senator Wallop and Heflin in Rebuttal
As Williams’ linguistic evidence was little more than an old argument
tied up in a new bow, Senators Wallop and Heflin were not challenged
in responding. Wallop noted first that Shuy’s analysis consisted of an
absurd framework, that “drain[ed] highly incriminating conversations
of their content by charting them as numbers in columns with vague
headings like ‘Request Information’ and ‘Report Facts’ . . . ”80. Such
classifications would never answer questions that spoke to motive. For
example, as Wallop stated, how could it ever answer why Williams
decided to attend so many meetings with these sheikhs, or quite simply
Id. at 3320.
Id. at 3332–33.
79
128 Cong. Rec. 3330 (1982). (If the verbal argument was not enough, Williams presented
evidence that coercion and entrapment could be seen under a psychological analysis as well.
Albert Levitt, a consulting psychologist for Temple Univ Unit of Law and Psychiatry and the Senior
Psychologist to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia analyzed the seating arrangements
and general situations around the Williams interviews and found them to be reminiscent of the
Asch experiments which focused on a group influencing one individual. The Asch Experiment
showed that “a majority yielded to the group pressure and went against their perceptions and
judgments without other inducements or enticements.” In the Abscam interviews, the agents had
set up an atmosphere that was “completely positive” creating no need to disagree. They further
introduced a foreign element and led the target to simply believe this was the way “Arabs do
business. The target is physically outmanned and outtalked. Levitt concluded that the Abscam
targets were placed in a “double bind, i.e., accept the enticing offer to the city and the personal
money binding the deal or lose the offer to the city—lose the jobs and the revenue the business
would bring in.)
80
Id. at 3475.
77
78
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why he had not just said “no”?81
Senator Heflin would continue this line of reasoning by underscoring
the importance of distinguishing between “linguistic games,” that did
nothing to detect ethical misbehavior, and Williams’ actual conduct.82
Heflin demonstrated the laughable conclusion of Shuy’s linguistic
methods which purported to “prove” Williams had no criminal intent.83
Under Shuy’s linguistic framework, Heflin noted, the following
hypothetical dialogue would leave “A” free of any wrongdoing:
A. Hello.
B. Good to see you.
B. I brought the money.
B. There’s $5,000 in cash.
B. You can count it if you wish.
B. All you need to do is vote for “X”.
B. It will be greatly appreciated by all of us.
B. Let me know if we can do business again.
B. Thanks, again.
A. Goodbye.84
To maintain that based on such a dialogue “A” had no criminal
intent would be patently absurd, but that was the conclusion Shuy’s
methodology logically led to. As Heflin put it, the effort by Shuy to
show that Williams had been passive through linguistic phrasal
classification was irrelevant because at any time he was free to state
simply—and should have—that what they were doing was illegal.85
Heflin concluded that as Shuy’s classification could never account for
intent or motivation, it left the method itself questionable and its results
“full of a lot of holes.”86
Id. at 3475.
Id. at 3626.
83
Id. at 3626.
84
Id. at 3626.
85
Id. at 3627 (Senator Heflin stated: “it is undeniable that at any point in these proceedings Senator
Williams could have said, “Now, look, for the last time I’m telling you I won’t have anything to do
with getting Government contracts. That is improper, and probably illegal.”).
86
Id. at 3630.
81
82
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Williams’ decision to present essentially the same defense, as he had
in earlier investigations, made the Senator’s decision easy. Following
Heflin’s response, a parade of senators stepped to the podium and
overwhelmingly indicated that they would vote for Williams’ expulsion.
Even his colleague from New Jersey, Senator Bradley, at some political
risk, said he would vote for Williams’ expulsion.87
Rather than retreat from previous stances and cloak himself in the
banner of a higher principle, Williams had decided to try his luck at
the roulette, betting on the same number over and over again. Perhaps
Williams did deeply and honestly believe in his innocence, so his honor
dictated he had to continue to protest his innocence.88 Or perhaps
Williams could not fully appreciate that censure was his last best chance
at saving his seat. Regardless, there was no symbolic principle for the
Senate to clearly rally behind because Senator Williams had decided he
would not commit to one.
Conclusion
On March 11, 1982, recognizing that his arguments had proven
unavailing, Williams resigned his Senate seat.89 In his farewell address,
Williams stated, in what too many might seem ironic, that he decided
to resign because he did not wish “to see the Senate bring dishonor to
itself by expelling [him].”90 Only at the end, when his cause had been
lost, did he fully center on the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers, warning that following his hearing “the Senate . . . stands
accused and intimidated by another branch of government to whom we
may be forever subordinated and subjugated unless we are successful
in our resistance.”91 Williams continued also to claim that he had not
truly been heard, even though he had been. To that end, at the outset of
his Senate Hearing, Senator Wallop had insisted that Williams be “given
the benefit of every doubt.”92 Senator Eagleton had noted further that
Williams had been defended by the best and the brightest of the legal
field at trial, in his Ethics Committee Hearings and on the Senate floor.93
The truth was, as Senator Inouye reported hearing other Senators
Id. at 3816–17.
“Closing Remarks” Harrison Williams Special Collection, Rutgers Library, Box 375, Folder 55.
(Perhaps Williams’ final sentences in his resignation speech bespeaks this belief when he stated:
“My friends, I am innocent! I swear it! I stake my life on it—my honor!”).
89
128 Cong. Rec. 4003 (1982).
90
Id.
91
“Closing Remarks” Harrison Williams Special Collection, Rutgers Library, Box 375, Folder 55.
92
128 Cong. Rec. 2954, 2977 (1982).
93
128 Cong. Rec. 3621, 3645 (1982).
87
88
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say, in confidence, Harrison Williams “blew it.”94 He failed to speak to
his audience, to capture their attention, and excite their passion under
the banner of principle. Senators reportedly stated that “[h]e should
not have talked so long,” that “[i]t was rambling,” and that “[w]ith
the passage of every minute he was killing himself.”95 They confided
further that Williams “should have been a bit more humble” and
“appeared too arrogant.”96 Williams had spoken at length, but not of
any higher principle. He only spoke of his own lower order needs for
complete vindication. Because he did not speak to the Senate’s interests
as a body, he had no real hope of winning them over.97
It was Judge Bryant who best articulated the full dangerous
precedent set by Abscam—how politically unavailing even a successful
defense of entrapment might be for the accused—when he stated in
Kelly that he was “plagued with the unsettling realization that . . . even
if a [legislative representative] successfully invoked the defenses of
selective prosecution and/or entrapment, this would be of little solace
to him, for he nevertheless [would have] been destroyed as a voice in
public affairs.”98 Judge Bryant would conclude this observation with the
same clarion call against abandoning principle that Justice Brandeis had
made so many years earlier, stating “[i]f we condone such a measure,
the fall-out might well be intolerable for us all.”99 Unfortunately for
Williams, he could not articulate that vision as Bryant had and could not
capture the fears and imaginations of his colleagues. The price of that
failure had been his Senate seat and any chance at political redemption.

128 Cong. Rec. 3789, 3803 (1982).
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. (As Inouye himself later stated, he believed the reason for Williams’ ramblings and obstinate
re-litigation was simply that “Pete Williams believes that he is innocent.”).
98
United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 377 n.58 (D.D.C. 1982).
99
Id.
94
95
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